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Abstract
We propose an occupational choice model in which the quality of the state bureaucracy in￿ uences
aggregate output and the level of entrepreneurial activity through its participation in the labour
market. Skilled agents di⁄er in terms of their public service motivation: if agents with low public
mission become bureaucrats, they will use their position to rent seek, by employing an excessive
number of unskilled workers. This generates an upwards pressure on wages, which lowers pro￿ts
and deters entrepreneurship. A better equilibrium results when public service motivated agents
self-select into the state bureaucracy, since they exert high e⁄ort and employ a limited number of
workers. The model also shows that the working class might optimally choose to vote for an inef-
￿cient public sector. We provide evidence supporting the mechanism in our model by confronting
some of its main predictions to a variety of data sources.
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11 Introduction
Low quality and oversized public sectors are often perceived as an ine¢ cient use of budgetary resources
that, if redressed, could improve public service delivery or help reduce poverty. It is no surprise then
that two of the biggest institutional lenders to developing countries, The IMF and the World Bank,
have actively promoted the inclusion of governance and corruption issues on the development agenda
since the late 90s1. The concern with public sector ine¢ ciency and mismanagment is, however, not just
one of wasted pecuniary resources: poor bureaucratic quality appears to be so important because it
may also largely distort the operation of markets. Indeed, cross-country studies show that corruption
and rent seeking in the public bureaucracies can severely hurt private investment and are associated
with lower income per head [Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), and Keefer and Knack (1997)]2.
In this paper, we argue that an oversized and ine¢ cient public sector will not only a⁄ect the
economy￿ s performance by wasting scarce budgetary resources in the society, but also by misallocating
human resources, through its participation in labour markets. In particular, we suggest that the quality
of the top public bureaucracy determines the demand of unskilled workers by the public sector, which
in turn a⁄ects the equilibrium wage in the market for unskilled workers. When unskilled wages are
in￿ ated by excessive public sector demand, entrepreneurial pro￿ts will be reduced and the private
sector will lose attractiveness to potential entrepreneurs.
We focus on one particular aspect regarding the quality of bureaucrats that has attracted growing
interest over the past few years, i.e. whether or not they exhibit the appropriate ethics or disposition
for their jobs: e.g., Francois (2000), Murdock (2002), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Benabou and Tirole
(2006), Prendergast (2007), Macchiavello (2008), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008). Commonplace in this
literature is the presumption that monetary payo⁄s are not the only type of reward that individuals
pursue and the idea that pro-social behaviour cannot be perfectly monitored by monetary incentives.
In such a context, it proves desirable that state bureaucrats display a sense of mission and commitment
towards the society they must serve. Such a sense of social mission has long been explored by the
public administration literature, which refers to it as public service motivation, and a large number of
survey-based studies provide evidence of its relevance in explaining the e¢ ciency of public o¢ ces.3
Our starting point (in Sections 2 and 3) is an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents
and two di⁄erent sectors: the public sector managed by bureaucrats and the private sector managed
by entrepreneurs. There are two dimensions of heterogeneity among individuals. The ￿rst is the level
of skills (or schooling), which is assumed to be publicly observable. Only highly skilled (or highly
1See for example, "Good Governance: The IMF￿ s Role" (1998).
2This negative relationship is also highlighted by comparative studies that look at di⁄erent regions in Italy [Putnam
(1993) and Alesina, Danninger and Rostagno (2001)].
3See discussion in Francois (2000) and references therein (pp. 275 and 276).
2educated) individuals may become entrepreneurs or may be appointed state bureaucrats. The second
source of heterogeneity is the individuals￿intrinsic public service motivation, which is assumed to
be private information. The advantage of ￿lling the state bureaucracy with public service motivated
agents is that they are less inclined to rent seek.
In our model, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs need unskilled workers to carry out their productive
activities, and must compete for the same pool of these workers in the (competitive) labour market.
Entrepreneurial activities yield pro￿ts, which are naturally a decreasing function of the labour cost.
Bureaucrats earn a salary that follows the decision of a political process. Furthermore, since bureau-
crats enjoy (some) discretionary power over the public budget, they could ￿nd ways to abuse this
power in order to extract rents from the society.
An important issue in our model is then how rent seeking materialises in the economy. In that
regard, we argue that several among the main channels used by bureaucrats to generate and extract
rents require somehow over-sizing public employment. For example, bureaucrats may bloat the public
sector with excessive workers so as to extract di⁄erent kinds of perks from them. Alternatively,
overemployment may be the result of the creation of (unnecessary) jobs as a way to directly appropriate
income from that or as a channel to make transfers to certain desired groups of people.
Within this framework, we show that markets might coordinate activities in two (very) di⁄erent
types of equilibria. The key determinant for the equilibrium that emerges is which types of agents
self-select into the state bureaucracy. First, there exists an equilibrium in which only public service
motivated agents become bureaucrats. These agents carry out their jobs ethically, working hard on
keeping an e¢ cient public sector, which employs the lowest possible number of workers, subject to pro-
viding all public goods needed for the correct functioning of the economy. In turn, a lean public sector
disciplines wages in the labour market, which sustains high entrepreneurial pro￿ts, attracting those
agents whose main concern is their own consumption (pro￿t-driven agents) into the entrepreneurial
private sector.
However, the economy may also exhibit a di⁄erent type of equilibrium in which the allocation of
talents is not that one leading to the most e¢ cient operation of the public sector. When pro￿t-driven
agents control high-rank positions in the public sector, they abuse their power in order to extract
rents, which leads to overhiring public workers. More importantly, this (mis-)allocation of talents is
self-sustaining. A bloated public sector in￿ ates aggregate labour demand, pushing up the (unskilled)
equilibrium wage, which in turn lowers entrepreneurial pro￿ts and deters self-interested agents from
exercising their skills in the entrepreneurial sector.
Bureaucratic rent seeking is clearly ine¢ cient in our model. A crucial question that arises is
then whether individuals may ￿nd ways to device an institutional setup that precludes such rent
seeking. In Section 4, we explicitly introduce the political economy dimension into our model, and
3show that equilibria that involve rent-seeking bureaucrats may actually result endogenously from a
simple democratic political process. This may happen because the unskilled workers indirectly bene￿t
from the actions perpetrated by the rent-seekers, by receiving higher market wages. As a consequence,
they may be willing to support institutions that leave room open for rent seeking.
Our paper o⁄ers a novel theory for the joint determination of the size and skill composition of the
public sector, the amount of rent seeking by bureaucrats and the level of entrepreneurship, within a
general equilibrium model that also incorporates the political process whereby bureaucrats salaries are
set. The model also provides us with a set of predictions that we are able to confront empirically by
combining di⁄erent datasets (Section 5). More speci￿cally, one result of the model is that when the
public sector becomes an attractive option for rent-seeking agents its composition would tilt towards
a greater share of unskilled workers. As a result, regions with better managed public sectors should
also exhibit a larger fraction of skilled public employees. Using cross country variation of measures
of public sector performance and skills composition in the public sector, we show that the predicted
correlation between governance quality and skill composition holds, even when controlling for country
and regional characteristics.
Another important feature of the model is that, by expanding the demand of unskilled workers
(which, in turn, raises their wages), the public sector may end up crowding out the private sector. We
provide evidence of a negative correlation between income per head and public employment by looking
at cross-regional variation within ￿ve countries that show signi￿cant heterogeneity in terms of regional
development, namely: Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Spain and the US. Furthermore, as an interesting
counterexample, this correlation is not present in countries with lower inter-regional inequality, such
as Canada, Denmark and Sweden. Finally, the model predicts that regions with a bloated public
sector would pay relatively higher wages to blue collar workers. This result in turn implies that the
skill premium in those regions would be lower than if the public sector was not bloated. Using an
Argentinean household survey, we show that the skill premium is indeed larger in cities that show
features associated with an equilibrium where the public sector is e¢ ciently run.
In a related paper, Macchiavello (2008) also studies the possibility of multiple equilibria in an occu-
pational choice model with public service motivated agents, but looks at a public sector whose size and
educational composition is exogenously ￿xed, hence our setup allows us to deliver richer associations
between public employment, rent seeking and aggregate income. Moreover, the key mechanism in our
model, namely the wage distortion in the unskilled labour market, is also a novelty. In that regard, our
model highlights the importance of accounting for skills (or educational) di⁄erences, since the wage
distortion becomes a crucial feature in explaining the following two phenomena: i) why a bloated
public sector may adversely a⁄ect pro￿ts; ii) why a fraction of the society (the working class) may be
willing to support rent-seeking bureaucrats who sustain a large and ine¢ cient state apparatus. The
4latter point contributes then also to the political economy literature that has sought to endogenise
the emergence and persistence of ine¢ cient state institutions [e.g., Hassler et al (2003) and Acemoglu,
Ticchi and Vindigni (2008)], by suggesting another channel that could generate political support for
institutions that depress aggregate productivity.
Our paper also relates to the growing literature on the quality of bureaucrats and politicians, e.g.
Besley (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Mattozi and Merlo (2008),
Bond (2008). A key aspect of all this literature is that it studies the process of self-selection into
bureaucratic and political jobs within a partial equilibrium approach: in particular, it assumes that
the returns in the private sector are exogenous and remain una⁄ected by who end up in the public
sector. By contrast, in our model, the interplay between self-selection into public bureaucracy and the
returns to private entrepreneurship lies at the heart of our theory and its main predictions.
Finally, occupational choice models in the development literature have so far mostly studied the
long-run consequences of ￿nancial markets imperfections.4 In particular, Ghatak, Morelli and Sj￿str￿m
(2007) have focused on how ￿nancial markets imperfections may interact with the inability of markets
to allocate agents to the occupations for which they are comparatively most suited. Our paper sheds
light on how imperfections in the sorting of public sector bureaucrats may also result in market
distortions which preclude full development of the private entrepreneurial sector, even in the absence
of credit market imperfections.
Public Sector Overmanning and Rent Seeking: some anecdotal discussion
A key feature in our theory is the notion that an oversized public sector is somehow a symptom of
bureaucratic opportunistic behaviour. One of the ￿rst studies to propose a theoretical link between
rent seeking and the size of the public sector is Niskanen (1971), which argues that bureaucrats are
self-interested agents who tend to seek to increase the size of the budgets they manage as much as
possible. In our model, such self-interested attitude by a fraction of the society leads to expanding
public employment well beyond the level required to e¢ ciently produce the public goods demanded
by the society. A similar view is present in Gelb, Knight and Sabot (1991) who maintain that public
employment is usually seen in underdeveloped economies as a rent-extraction device rather than as
an input to produce public goods.5
4E.g., Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), Ghatak, Morelli
and Sj￿str￿m (2001). Notable exceptions (besides the aforementioned article by Macchiavello) are Murphy et al (1991)
and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998). The former studies how the choice between entrepreneurship and rent-seeking activities
by the most talented individuals determines technical change and growth. The latter focuses on the e⁄ects of property
rights enforcement in a context of entrepreneurial opportunistic behaviour.
5Even in the cases of developed economies, the size of public employment seems to raise suspicion of opportunistic
behaviour. For example, Durden (1990) measures rent-seeking behaviour across US states by the share of workers
5The perception of excessive public employment as a salient trait in developing economies has led
the World Bank and IMF to recurrently include public sector downsizing clauses among the conditions
for granting ￿nancial aid (Rama, 1999). Anecdotal evidence of public sector overmanning in under-
developed regions is overwhelming [see, for example, Heller and Tait (1983), Gelb et al (1991), Kikeri
(1998)].6 In that respect, Rama (1999) asserts ￿ It is quite obvious that the public sectors of developing
countries are plagued with workers who contribute little to aggregate output or welfare, if anything at
all￿ . Interestingly, public sector overmanning seems to take place both in underdeveloped economies
and, also, in poorer regions within economies that display large degrees of cross-regional inequality.
In Liberia, for instance, the national security sector is claimed to be greatly overmanned, having ￿ nu-
merous "ghost workers" on the payroll ￿ employees who only report to work to collect their paycheck￿
RAND (2007). As a paradigm of cross-regional inequality among developed economies, Italian regions
exhibit analogous di⁄erences in the size and e¢ ciency of their public o¢ ces. For example, Alesina et
al (2001) report huge di⁄erences in size and productivity of postal o¢ ces across Italian regions: while
in the North it requires 179 postal workers to deliver 100,000 units of correspondence, the number of
workers rises to 566 in the Centre, and to 1,783 in the South (the fraction of postal workers among
the total number of workers is also largest in the South, followed by the Centre, and smallest in the
North).7
Bloating the public sector with unnecessary jobs may generate various sorts of rents to state
bureaucrats, either directly by increasing their income (or that of close relatives) or indirectly by
gaining political support to them. Direct sources of rents are, for example, the use of public funds
for feather-bedding: the idea that bureaucrats may increase the size of their o¢ ces with the intention
extract private perks from unneeded workers. Similarly, nepotistic interests may lead to the creation
of excessive public jobs so as to transfer income to relatives; for example, The Economist (2008) raised
the issue of nepotism and favouritism by Italian universities, mentioning that ￿ The creation of jobs for
relatives and friends has helped to in￿ ate the number of Italian academics[...], 13,000 junior positions
had been advertised in the past 7 years, but 26,000 were actually ￿lled￿ . Indirect sources of rents may
be associated to clientelistic practices by state bureaucrats, where public jobs are somehow exchanged
for political support (Robinson and Verdier, 2002). The following passage in Geddes (1994, page
employed in federal and state government jobs.
6An article in New York Times (April 15, 1987) entitled ￿ In Brazil, Battle of the Bloated Bureaucracy￿recounts
various examples of overmanned public o¢ ces in di⁄erent states of Brazil. Probably, as one of the most eloquent ones,
we can cite this fragment ￿ So bloated was the bureaucracy inherited by Miguel Arraes, the new Governor of Pernambuco,
he concluded that he could administer the state with only 30 percent of the current employees￿ .
7Analogous results in terms of productivity across regions are also shown for police o¢ cers, tax inspectors and railway
workers (see Table 3, therein).
627), with reference to Latin America, condenses somehow these di⁄erent motives, viewed from the
perspective of state bureaucrats:
￿ Administrators and politicians under traditional arrangements have the power to decide who will be hired
to ￿ll government posts. These o¢ cials have the choice of hiring the people who will contribute most to the
o¢ cials￿personal welfare (usually members of their own families); hiring the people who will contribute most
to consolidating political support for themselves or their parties; or hiring the people who will contribute
most to administrative e⁄ectiveness (the most technically quali￿ed applicants). For the administrator or
politician involved, choosing the applicant most likely to contribute to improving the administration often
involves a certain and immediate loss of either personal or political bene￿ts.￿
2 Setup of the Model
2.1 Environment
We consider a single-period economy with two productive sectors: i) the public sector, and ii) the
private sector. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of risk-neutral individuals with mass equal
to 1 + . A mass  2 (12) of the individuals are unskilled; the remainder unit mass are skilled.
Individuals￿skills are publicly observable. Every individual (regardless of his skill) is endowed with 1
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unit of unskilled labour time, which he could supply in the labour market.
2.1.1 The Private Sector
The private sector is perfectly competitive. Firms produce a private good using two types of inputs:
one unit of entrepreneurial skills and unskilled labour (in variable amount). (From now on we will
use the terms unskilled labour and labour interchangeably; likewise for the terms unskilled workers
and workers.) Entrepreneurial skills are possessed only by the skilled agents, who are all identically
endowed with one unit of these skills. An individual who chooses to become an entrepreneur cannot
simultaneously supply labour (i.e., he must specialise in one of the two occupations).
A ￿rm owned by a skilled agent produces output (the private good) according to the following







1 + 2 ¬ 2￿
if 0 ￿  ￿ 1
2 if   1
(1)
The labour market is competitive. Hence, entrepreneurs must pay the market wage, , for each
unit of labour they hire. As a result, the optimisation problem of the entrepreneurs yields the following








if 0 ￿  ￿ 2
0 if   2
(2)
Entrepreneurial pro￿ts, ￿ ￿  () ¬ , will accrue to the skilled agents running the ￿rms, and





2 ¬  +
2
4
if 0 ￿  ￿ 2
 if   2
(3)
2.1.2 The Public Sector
The public sector is composed by a continuum of public o¢ ces with mass   1. In each o¢ ce a pure
public good is produced. Each public o¢ ce is managed by a bureaucrat, who decides the number of
unskilled workers to hire for his o¢ ce. Bureaucrats are thus public employees with some degree of
discretionary power over the allocation of the public budget. Throughout the paper, we assume that
the entire public sector is fully ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes collected by the central administration
and distributed among the public o¢ ces according to their needs.
Each bureaucrat is appointed by the central administration with the mandate to guarantee that
one unit of the public good is produced by his o¢ ce.9 Only skilled individuals may be appointed
bureaucrats. Once an individual accepts a bureaucratic job, he cannot resign. The output produced by
each o¢ ce is publicly observable. If the task assigned to the bureaucrat is not ful￿lled, the bureaucrat
is subject to a punishment ￿  1 (measured in terms of disutility).
Denote by  the amount of public good produced in o¢ ce . We assume the following production








where  = f01g is the level of e⁄ort exerted by bureaucrat  and  equals the amount of labour hired
by this bureaucrat. Bureaucratic e⁄ort is unobservable, while  is publicly observable. The variable
￿ is an idiosyncratic o¢ ce-productivity shock that can take two possible values, namely: ￿ = f051g,
each one with probability one-half. The realisation of ￿ is learned by the bureaucrat only after he has
8None of the main results of the paper crucially depend on the speci￿c production function assumed in (1). The
reason for choosing (1) is that it yields a linear labour demand function, which in turn allows the model to deliver neat
closed-form solutions. A more standard function with decreasing marginal productivity of labour, e.g.,  () = 
￿, with
￿ 2 (01), would lead to similar results, but at the cost of more involved algebraic derivations.
9Think of this amount as the level of public good that has been somehow decided optimal by the central government
and must be provided to the society. Naturally, the nominal amount 1 is just a normalisation, measured in terms of
private good units.
8accepted the job in o¢ ce . The bureaucrat  is the only agent who is able to observe the realisation of
￿. After observing the value taken by ￿, the bureaucrat announces e ￿ to the central administration
in order to ask for the needed funds. If a bureaucrat announces e ￿ = 05, the central administration
audits the o¢ ce to check whether this is actually true. A false announcement (e ￿ 6= ￿) is detected
with probability ￿ 2 (01), in which case the bureaucrat is subject to the punishment ￿.
The function (4) stipulates that bureaucratic e⁄ort and labour are substitutes in the production
of the public good. The substitutability between  and  is a key assumption in our model, hence it
is worth discussing in further detail the sorts of phenomena that it intends to capture.10 Essentially,
substituting e⁄ort for outside workers is how bureaucrats rent-seek in our model. In other words, rent
seeking materialises as bureaucrats hiring a relatively large number of public employees, without that
leading to a larger provision of public goods, but actually allowing bureaucrats to reduce their own
e⁄ort. Such a phenomenon may be occurring through a variety of channels; for example:
1. The bureaucratic task may be thought of monitoring workers in the o¢ ce, and  can accordingly
be interpreted as monitoring e⁄ort. In that regard, a larger  would allow to produce  = 1 with
a lower  owing to better monitoring of the workforce. For example, more intense monitoring
might imply that the bureaucrat is able to reduce shirking in the workplace and thus less workers
would be needed to ful￿ll a given task.
2. The bureaucrat may choose to hire workers in excess in order to use some of them to do (part
of) the bureaucrat￿ s job. In that way, the bureaucrat would be able to reduce his e⁄ort/time
in the public o¢ ce, and use this "saved" e⁄ort/time for his own private businesses or leisure
(thereby, increasing his private income and/or consumption).
3. The bureaucrat may simply overhire workers as a way to achieve extra perks. For instance, the
bureaucrat may claim to need two private drivers, when he actually needs only one for his task,
so as to use the second driver to drive his children to school. Additionally, he may hire one extra
secretary or gardener and use them for his private matters. To be precise, these perk-seeking
behaviour is not exactly decreasing the level of  within the public goods production function
(4) above. However, they can still be understood as reducing the bureaucrat￿ s e⁄ort in his home-
production function (by passing some of his home-production e⁄ort cost onto other individuals
hired as "public" workers).
4. Another possible interpretation is that the bureaucrat overhires workers by creating unnecessary
public jobs as a way to increase the income of relatives, friends or certain desired groups of
10Function (4) assumes perfect substitutability between  and ; this is mainly for algebraic tractability. In qualitative
terms, what is essential for our model is that there exists some degree of substitutability among these two inputs.
9people. Again, this would not exactly lower  in (4), but it would reduce the e⁄ort cost per
earned income of certain agents the bureaucrat may care for.
More generally, the substitutability of  for  in (4) could be simply interpreted as a reduced-form
for a variety of channels whereby bureaucrats may extract rents from the society by bloating their
public o¢ ces. In that regard, actions allowing bureaucrats to somehow lower their e⁄ort cost (or that
of certain desired groups of people), by concomitantly loading this cost on the society via increasing
, could be interpreted in our model as re￿ ecting some sort of rent-seeking behaviour.
2.1.3 Preferences: Public Service Motivation
Skilled agents di⁄er in terms of their level of public service motivation.11 A fraction ￿ 2 (01) among
those individuals are public service motivated agents (henceforth, PSM). The remainder, 1 ¬ ￿, are
referred to as pro￿t-driven agents (henceforth, PD). In short, a PSM agent is more willing to exert
e⁄ort if he is appointed for a bureaucratic post. Agents￿preferences (i.e., whether an agent is PSM or
PD) are private information.
Bureaucrats derive utility from their income and disutility from the e⁄ort they exert at work. In
particular, conditional on having ful￿lled the task  = 1, the bureaucrat ￿ s utility function reads
as follows, where  denotes the bureaucrats salary and ￿ measures the degree of public service
motivation of bureaucrat :12








0 if  is a PD agent,
￿  0 if  is a PSM agent.
Remark 1 For completeness, all payo⁄ functions should also include two additional terms: (i) a
positive term capturing the utility derived from the consumption of the public goods, (ii) a negative
term equal to the lump-sum taxes paid by each individual. Since both (i) and (ii) will a⁄ect all agents
in the economy equally (irrespective of their skills and preferences), there is no harm to our results by
not explicitly including any of these two terms in any of the payo⁄ functions, because neither (i) nor
(ii) will have any impact on the optimal occupational choices of the individuals.
11The distribution of public service motivation among the unskilled is irrelevant to our model, hence we leave it
unspeci￿ed. (The unskilled cannot become bureaucrats, which is the only occupation for which the degree of public
service motivation a⁄ects equilibrium behaviours.)
12We could alternative work with a utility function that elicits some (non-pecuniary) reward from working as a state
bureaucrat, which is itself increasing in the degree of public service motivation, like:  =  + ￿￿ ¬ (1 + ￿), with
￿  0. None of the results of the paper would be altered if we did so, as this would simply increase the willingness of
PSM agents to work as public bureaucrats.
10As previously described in Section 2.1.2, a bureaucrat may either end up managing an o¢ ce with
￿ = 05 or one with ￿ = 1. A bureaucrat who runs an o¢ ce where ￿ = 05 will optimally announce
e ￿ = 05, and set  = 1 and  = 2. To see this, notice ￿rst that there is no reason to announce
a higher productivity than the actual one (as that would necessarily leave the bureaucrat with less
workers than those needed to achieve  = 1). Second, if the bureaucrat sets  = 0, he will not be
able to produce  = 1 (even if having announced e ￿ = 05 and hired  = 2), and he will thus be
subjected to the punishment ￿  1, which is larger than his disutility of e⁄ort.
However, truth-telling is not guaranteed if a bureaucrat ￿nds out that ￿ = 1: in this case the
bureaucrat may wish to lie about the real productivity of o¢ ce  and announce e ￿ = 05, so as to give
himself room to shirk.




 ￿￿  1
The ￿rst inequality in Assumption 1 entails that PSM bureaucrats will always truthfully announce
e ￿ = 1, and set  = 1 and  = 0, accordingly. The second inequality in Assumption 1 implies that,
after PD bureaucrats observe ￿ = 1, they will announce e ￿ = 05 so as to allow themselves to set
 = 2 and, hence,  = 0.13 In essence, on the one hand, Assumption 1 states that PSM bureaucrats
are su¢ ciently motivated to always ￿ do the right thing￿in their jobs. On the other hand, it states that
the probability of detection of cheaters (or the level of punishment that can be in￿ icted on them) is
not large enough to deter PD bureaucrats from rent-seeking.
From the previous discussion it follows that the amount of employment in each of the public o¢ ces
will depend both on the productivity shock and on the bureaucrat￿ s type. A PSM-bureaucrat will hire





0 if ￿ = 1
2 if ￿ = 05
(6)
On the other hand, PD-bureaucrats will hire public workers according to:
 = 2, regardless of the value of ￿. (7)
PSM-bureaucrats always exert e⁄ort  = 1, whereas PD-bureaucrats put  = 1 if and only
if ￿ = 05, setting instead  = 0 when ￿ = 1. By using these results, we can write down the level
13To see this, notice that the expected utility for a bureaucrat that announces  ￿ = 05 and sets  = 0 equals ¬￿￿. A
PSM bureaucrat then prefers to announce  ￿ = 1 and set  = 1, since this yields utility equal to ¬(1+￿)
¬ 1  ¬￿￿.
On the other hand, if a PD bureaucrat announces  ￿ = 1 and sets  = 1, he will obtain utility equal to  ¬ 1   ¬ ￿￿.
11of (expected) utility achieved by each type of bureaucrats:
 =  ¬ 1
1+￿ (8)
 =  ¬ 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) (9)
2.2 Timing of the Events
The events in the model occur in six di⁄erent stages, according to the following sequence:
1. Bureaucrats salary decision: The central administration ￿xes  once-and-for-all.
2. First-stage occupational choice of skilled agents: Each skilled agent decides whether or
not to apply for a bureaucratic position in the public sector. Applying for a bureaucratic post
is costless.
3. Allocation of bureaucratic posts: If the total mass of applicants to bureaucratic jobs is no
larger than , all the applicants obtain the job. Otherwise, the mass  of bureaucratic posts is
assigned by a draw among all the applicants.
4. Second-stage occupational choice of skilled agents: Each skilled agent who did not apply
(in stage 2) or did not get (in stage 3) a bureaucratic job decides whether or not to start a
private entrepreneurial project.
5. Announcements and labour market transactions: Each bureaucrat  observes ￿ 2 f051g
and announces e ￿ 2 f051g. Bureaucrats and entrepreneurs hire workers in the labour market.
All remaining agents supply their half unit-time labour endowment in the market.
6. Production stage, auditing and punishments: Production takes place and all payments
are made. The central administration audits all o¢ ces that announced e ￿ = 05 in stage 5, and
subjects all bureaucrats who are detected with e ￿ 6= ￿ or who failed to produce  = 1 to a
punishment ￿  1.
3 Market Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we study the joint determination of the individuals￿optimal occupational choices
and the (unskilled) workers market-clearing wage. For the moment, we abstract from studying the
determination of the bureaucrats salary , which, throughout this section, is taken exogenously given
(with the only restriction that it must be high enough to ensure that all bureaucratic positions are
￿lled when individuals choose their occupations optimally). The reason for taking  initially as given
12is that we ￿rst wish to focus only on interactions operating through markets. In the next section,
we proceed to endogenise , by letting it be decided by majority voting among all individuals in the
economy.14
Henceforth, we impose the following two parametric restrictions:








Assumption 2 states that are enough PSM agents in the economy to possibly cover all bureaucratic
positions in the public sector: this assumption ensures that equilibria where only PSM agents become
bureaucrats may (in principle) exist. Assumption 3 is easier to interpret by noticing from (8) and (9)
that it can also be written as:  ¬  ￿ . This can be interpreted as saying that the di⁄erent
types of skilled agents are su¢ ciently heterogeneous in terms of their preferences for bureaucratic jobs
relative to entrepreneurial activities.
3.1 Optimal Occupational Choice (Partial Equilibrium Analysis)
Before proceeding to study the general equilibrium results of the model, it proves instructive to ￿rst
characterise the optimal occupational choice of the individuals, given the wage  (and the bureaucrats
salary ). From now on, and without any loss of generality, we assume that whenever agents are
indi⁄erent between a bureaucratic job and any other occupation, they always choose the former. In
addition, to facilitate the exposition, for the remainder of Section 3 we will restrict the values that 
may take, such that the following condition holds:
Assumption 4 (wage-dependent bureaucrats pool)  + 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) ￿   2 + 1
2 (1 + ￿￿)
Assumption 4 implies that there exists a wage cut-o⁄ value, b  2 (02), such that: if   b , PD
agents choose not to apply for a bureaucratic post since they are better o⁄ as private entrepreneurs;
whereas, if  ￿ b , these agents actually prefer a bureaucratic job to running a private ￿rm.15 Notice
that, if  ￿ 2 + 05(1 + ￿￿), then even PD agents would always wish to apply for a bureaucratic
post, no matter the value of . As we want to allow (in principle) for equilibria in which PD agents
14More precisely, in the next section, we assume that people vote for the  to be paid to state bureaucrats. This
will be decided before all the market interactions analysed in this section take place. We also assume that the level of
 cannot be renegotiated or changed afterwards. Notice then that, once  is chosen by majority voting, this variable
becomes exogenous from the individuals￿viewpoint: in that regard, the analysis of this section can be interpreted as the
subgame that follows the decision over 






2 (1 + ￿￿) ¬ 
￿
; which given Assumption 4 is strictly
positive and smaller than 2
13self-select away from the bureaucratic positions in the public sector, we impose that upper bound on
. On the other hand, the lower bound  ￿ + 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) allows (in principle) equilibria where both
PSM and PD agents wish to apply for bureaucratic jobs. Notice ￿nally that, given this lower bound
on , Assumption 3 ensures that PSM agents will always prefer bureaucratic jobs to entrepreneurship.
Figure 1 plots the payo⁄ functions of bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and workers, for a varying ,
given Assumptions 1, 3, and 4. These payo⁄ functions correspond to those elicited before in (3) for
the entrepreneurs, (8) for PSM bureaucrats, and (9) for PD bureaucrats; the 
2 -line portrays the payo⁄
of any agent in the economy who becomes a worker. From Figure 1, one can immediately pin down
the optimal occupational choice of the skilled at each level of .16
￿ For all 0 ￿   b  : Only PSM agents apply for a bureaucratic post. All the skilled agents that
did not apply or get a bureaucratic job become entrepreneurs and hire ()  0 workers in the
market.
￿ For all b  ￿  ￿ 2 : Both PSM and PD agents apply for a bureaucratic post. If  2 [b 2),
all the skilled agents that did not get a bureaucratic job become entrepreneurs and hire ()  0
workers; if  = 2, they choose indi⁄erently between becoming (self-employed) entrepreneurs
or workers.
￿ For all 2   ￿ 2[ ¬ 05(1 + ￿￿)] : Both PSM and PD agents apply for a bureaucratic post.
All the skilled agents that did not get a bureaucratic job become workers.
￿ For all 2[ ¬ 05(1 + ￿￿)]   ￿ 2[ ¬ (1 + ￿)
¬1] : Only PSM agents apply for a bureaucratic
post. All the skilled agents that did not apply or get a bureaucratic job become workers.
￿ For all   2[¬(1 + ￿)
¬1] : No agent applies for a bureaucratic post. All agents in the economy
become workers.
The main partial equilibrium result that we wish to stress here is the existence of a wage threshold,
b , at which PD agents change their minds regarding their most desired occupation. Below b , PD
agents optimally self-select away from the public sector, since they are better o⁄ making pro￿ts in the
private sector. However, for b  ￿ , pro￿ts are not high enough to attract PD agents, who turn out
to be better o⁄ as (rent-seeking) bureaucrats.
16The optimal occupational choice of the unskilled is trivial: the only two occupations they can undertake are either
working for the entrepreneurs or for the bureaucrats, among which they are in fact indi⁄erent since wages in both
occupations must be equal in equilibrium.
14Figure 1: Payo⁄ functions by di⁄erent occupations
3.2 General Equilibrium Analysis
Two additional conditions must be satis￿ed in the general equilibrium analysis: ￿rst, the labour
market must clear; second, no bureaucratic post must remain un￿lled. More formally:
De￿nition 1 (Market General Equilibrium) A market general equilibrium is characterised by:
i) a market wage, , ii) a bureaucrats salary, , and iii) an occupational choice by each agent in the
economy; such that the following three conditions are simultaneously satis￿ed:
1. All individuals choose their occupations optimally.
2. The labour market clears (i.e., the aggregate labour demand by the bureaucrats and the entrepre-
neurs must equal the sum of the labour endowments across all the remaining individuals)
3. All bureaucratic posts are ￿lled (i.e., the mass of applicants for a bureaucratic post must be at
least equal to ).
Condition 1 has been illustrated in the previous subsection. Condition 2 (the labour market
clearing condition) represents the natural way to endogenise , given the assumption that this market
is competitive. Finally, the third condition simply requires that, in equilibrium, there must be enough
applicants to ￿ll all bureaucratic positions in the public sector. Regarding this last condition, two
remarks apply. First, given Assumptions 2, 3 and 4, it is immediately satis￿ed for any , that may
clear the labour market. Second, although Condition 3 restricts the range of values that  may
possibly take in equilibrium, it does not fully endogenise it (more precisely, as it is speci￿ed, our
model is not able to determine the exact value of  solely by means of market-clearing conditions and
optimal occupational choices).
15Our main focus here is on the interplay between the optimal occupational choice of the skilled
and the equilibrium wage in the labour market, and how this may give rise to equilibria exhibiting
very di⁄erent allocations of skills and productive e¢ ciency. Bearing in mind the optimal occupational
choice of the individuals, and using the equations (6) and (7), we can write down the analytical
expressions for the (aggregate) labour demand and labour supply functions, respectively:
() =
8
> > > > > > > > <












+ (2 ¬ ￿) if b  ￿  ￿ 2
(2 ¬ ￿) if 2   ￿ 2[ ¬ 05(1 + ￿￿)]
 if 2[ ¬ 05(1 + ￿￿)]   ￿ 2[ ¬ (1 + ￿)
¬1]
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> > > > > :
2 if   2
[2(1 ¬ ) + 2] if  = 2
(1 ¬ ) + 2 if 2   ￿ 2[ ¬ (1 + ￿)
¬1]
1 + 2 if   2[ ¬ (1 + ￿)
¬1]
(11)
From (10), we can observe that the labour demand function is non-monotonic in . In particular,
() "jumps up" at the wage level  = b  by the (strictly positive) amount (1 ¬ ￿). This happens
because, at  = b  PD agents￿most desired occupation switches from entrepreneurship to state
bureaucracy. Whenever   b  all the public o¢ ces end up managed by PSM bureaucrats, who
properly ful￿ll their tasks (i.e. they exert high e⁄ort) and hire (on average) one unit of unskilled
labour each. On the other hand, just above  = b , a fraction (1 ¬ ￿) of the mass  of bureaucratic
jobs end up in the hands of PD agents, who (whenever they are able to) abuse their positions by hiring
more workers per o¢ ce than that is really needed. As a result, at  = b  the total mass of public
workers abruptly rises from  to (2 ¬ ￿).
Henceforth, we restrict the mass of public o¢ ces, such that the following condition holds:
Assumption 5 2(2 ¬ ) ￿ 1
Assumption 5 puts an upper bound on . Its role is to ensure that, no matter the parametric
con￿guration of (￿) 2 (12)￿[1), skilled agents will never work as unskilled workers in equilibrium.
It is important to clarify that Assumption 5 is by no means crucial for our main results. Yet, we prefer
to pose this assumption, as it simpli￿es the analysis by reducing the number of general equilibrium
cases to those which seem more illustrative and interesting for our purposes.17
17For  in￿nitesimally smaller than 2, labour demand approaches (2 ¬ ￿) while labour supply equals 2. The
former is decreasing in ￿, hence (given Assumption 2) it reaches a maximum when ￿ = . Assumption 5 then ensures that,
for any  2 (12), labour demand is never larger than labour supply whenever  ￿ 2. Notice, too, that Assumption 5
16Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 - 5 hold. Then:














(1 + ￿￿) ￿  (12)
(ii) An equilibrium in which a fraction ￿ of the bureaucratic jobs go to PSM agents, while the remaining














(1 + ￿￿) ￿ (￿) (13)
Proof. Part (i). An equilibrium in which only PSM agents apply for a bureaucratic post exists
if and only if () crosses () at a wage level (strictly) below b . This happens if and only if
(1 ¬ )[1 ¬ b (2)





2 (1 + ￿￿) ¬ 
￿
leads to (12).
Part (ii). First, notice from (10) and (11) that the highest possible wage that may hold in
equilibrium is  = 2, since for any   2 labour supply necessarily exceeds labour demand. As a
result, an equilibrium in which both PSM and PD agents apply for a bureaucratic position exists i⁄
(b ) ￿  Using (10) and (11), this requires (1 ¬ )[1 ¬ b (2)
¬1] + (2 ¬ ￿) ￿ 2. Finally, from
this inequality the condition in (13) obtains after some algebra.
Proposition 1 (i) shows that a necessary condition for keeping PD agents away from the state
bureaucracy is that the bureaucrats salary   . Yet, as we show next, condition (12) is actually
not su¢ cient to ensure such a goal is achieved. In particular, Part (ii) of the proposition shows that,
when  ￿ (￿), an equilibrium (possibly not unique) exists in which all skilled agents in the economy
apply for a bureaucratic job. Notice that 0(￿)  0, implying that an economy with a larger fraction
of PSM agents exhibits a smaller range of values of  for which such an equilibrium exists.
The following corollary combines the previous two results and describes the di⁄erent types of
equilibria that may arise in the model, given its parametric con￿guration. Figure 2 illustrates each of
the three cases.
Corollary 1 Depending on the speci￿c parametric con￿guration of the model, three di⁄erent equilib-
rium cases are possible:
(i) Lean public sector unique equilibrium: If   (￿), the equilibrium in the economy is
unique. In the equilibrium, only PSM agents apply for (and obtain) bureaucratic jobs, the mass of
unskilled employees equals , and the wage of unskilled workers is ￿ = (2 ¬ )(1 ¬ ).
can simply be written as:  ￿ 1 ¬

1
2. An extension of our results when Assumption 5 is relaxed is available from the
authors upon request.
17(ii) Bloated public sector unique equilibrium: If  ￿ , the equilibrium in the economy is
unique. In the equilibrium, both PSM and PD agents apply for bureaucratic jobs, a fraction ￿ of these
jobs go to PSM agents, a fraction 1 ¬ ￿ go to PD agents, the mass of unskilled employees equals
(2 ¬ ￿), and the wage of unskilled workers is ￿￿ = [(2 ¬ ) + 2(1 ¬ ￿)](1 ¬ ).
(iii) Multiple equilibria: If (￿) ￿   , there exist two equilibria in the model. One of the equi-
libria features a ￿ lean public sector equilibrium￿ , with identical characteristics as that of case (i) above.
The other equilibrium features a ￿ bloated public sector equilibrium￿ , with identical characteristics as
that of case (ii) above.
Henceforth, for brevity, we will often refer to each of the two types of equilibria described above,
respectively, as lean equilibrium and bloated equilibrium.18
The lean equilibrium is characterised by an e¢ cient allocation of agents to activities, in the sense
that all bureaucratic jobs end up in the hands of the agents who display a comparative advantage
for these jobs: the PSM agents. PSM bureaucrats manage their o¢ ces ethically, exerting always high
e⁄ort and hiring relatively few workers. This disciplines wages in the labour market, which in turn
means that entrepreneurial pro￿ts remain attractive enough to keep PD agents away from rent seeking
in the public sector.
However, the economy may well fail to coordinate the allocation of agents correctly, ending up in a
bloated equilibrium, as those where the market wage is ￿￿ ￿ b . In such cases, it becomes optimal for
all skilled agents (both PSM and PD) to try to get a bureaucratic job in the public sector. As a result,
in a bloated equilibrium, a fraction 1 ¬ ￿ of the public o¢ ces end up managed by PD bureaucrats
who abuse their discretionary power to rent seek by hiring an excessive number of public workers.
This (mis-)allocation of agents is self-sustaining since a bloated public sector in￿ ates aggregate labour
demand, pushing up the equilibrium wage, which in turn lowers pro￿ts and discourages the PD agents
from exercising their skills in the private sector.19
18All the equilibria in Figure 2 are stable. In addition, if assumed that, whenever the skilled agents are indi⁄erent
between becoming bureaucrats or entrepreneurs, they randomise among the two occupations, Figure 2 (iii) would exhibit
a third equilibrium at  =  . Notice, though, that this equilibrium would be unstable.
19Our model focuses on the e⁄ect of  on the self-selection into bureaucracy, and rules out (by construction) any
e⁄ect that a higher  might have on incentives once an agent accepts a bureaucratic job. Notwithstanding, even if a
higher  carries some e¢ ciency-wage component, as long as PSM agents are intrinsically more attracted to bureaucratic
jobs than PD agents are, our self-selection mechanism should remain at play. Furthermore, empirical evidence on the
incentive-e⁄ect suggests this e⁄ect is quite weak at best. See for example Rauch and Evans (2000) and Van Rijckenghem
and Weder (2001).
18Figure 2: Labour Market Equilibria ￿three di⁄erent cases.
The three cases are plotted for a given con￿guration of ￿￿;￿￿ and , and di⁄erent values of 
3.3 Total Output and Welfare Analysis
3.3.1 Aggregate Output
How do the two equilibria in Figure 2 (iii) compare to one another in terms of aggregate output?
Aggregate output in the lean public sector equilibrium ( ￿) is strictly larger than in the bloated equi-
librium ( ￿￿). The following two equations make this point apparent, where (￿) is the entrepreneurial




































which is strictly positive. Also, from those two equations it can be readily observed that the output
gap is solely explained by lower private output in the bloated equilibrium, as aggregate public output
equals  in both equilibria. Yet, the underlying cause why  ￿   ￿￿ actually rests on the public sector
behaviour. More precisely, the output gap is a consequence of the ine¢ cient allocation of skills in the
state bureaucracy. Intuitively, PD bureaucrats tend to expand public employment (relative to PSM
bureaucrats), which reduces the labour supply left available for other activities in the economy and
thus (partly) crowds out the private sector. However, PD bureaucrats expand the size of the public
sector workforce only with the intention to rent-seek from it; hence, although public employment is
19higher, public output remains constant, implying that aggregate output is smaller in an equilibrium
with a fraction (1 ¬ ￿) of PD bureaucrats than in one where all bureaucrats are PSM agents.
The previous paragraph compares aggregate output in situations where multiple equilibria are
feasible for a speci￿c economy. However, the result is in fact more general than that, as it can be
extended to any equilibrium that may arise for a given parametric con￿guration on the model.
Corollary 2 Take an economy with a given set of parameters: ￿￿;￿￿ and , and which satis￿es
Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5. Depending on the speci￿c level of , two broad types of equilibria may arise
in the economy: (i) equilibria in which only PSM agents apply for bureaucratic jobs; (ii) equilibria
where both PSM and PD agents apply for bureaucratic jobs.






 where ￿ =
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 where ￿￿ =
[(2¬)+2(1¬￿)]
(1¬) .
Corollary 2 then states that, given the parametric con￿guration of the economy (i.e., given
￿￿;￿￿ and ), aggregate output is always larger in an equilibrium without rent-seeking bu-
reaucrats (where it equals  ￿) than in one where a fraction 1¬￿ are rent-seeking bureaucrats (where
it equals  ￿￿).
3.3.2 Welfare Analysis
Let us focus again on the cases in which multiple equilibria are feasible ￿i.e., Figure 2 (iii). Although
under multiple equilibria output is higher in the lean public sector equilibrium, it turns out that
this equilibrium does not Pareto dominate the bloated one. As a consequence, an aggregate welfare
assessment would ￿rst require postulating some speci￿c social welfare function. Such an aggregate
welfare assessment is beyond the scope of this paper. However, with the model as it stands, welfare
comparisons within groups of individuals are still feasible, and moreover they yield some further
interesting insights.
Before proceeding to such analysis, one issue that we now need to take properly into account
is the fact that the total amount of (lump-sum) taxes levied on individuals will di⁄er across the two
equilibria. Let ￿ and ￿￿ denote the tax on each individual in the lean and in the bloated equilibrium,
respectively. It is straightforward to notice that ￿  ￿￿.20
PSM agents. In the lean equilibrium, a fraction b=￿ become bureaucrats and get utility equal to
 ¬ ￿; the remaining fraction (1¬ b=￿) start a private ￿rm and their payo⁄ equals ￿(￿)¬ ￿,
where ￿(￿)  . In the bloated equilibrium, only a fraction  manage to obtain a bureaucratic
20This is the case because of two (related) reasons. In the bloated equilibrium: (i) the number of unskilled workers in
the public sector is larger, and (ii) their wages are higher.
20job, which yields  ¬ ￿￿ as a payo⁄; the remainder fraction (1 ¬ ) receive a payo⁄ equal to
￿(￿￿)¬￿￿, where ￿(￿￿)  ￿(￿) due to ￿￿  ￿. Therefore, all PSM agents are (in expectation)
better o⁄ in a lean public sector equilibrium.
The fact that ￿￿  ￿ naturally reduces PSM agents￿welfare in the bloated equilibrium relative
to the lean equilibrium. In addition to paying higher taxes, lower PSM agents￿welfare in a bloated
equilibrium stems from two additional sources. First, a smaller fraction of PSM agents are able to
obtain a bureaucratic job, which represents their most desired occupation. Second, those who become
entrepreneurs make lower pro￿ts. The ￿rst source is simply the result of more competition for a ￿xed
number of bureaucratic posts. The second is a negative externality generated by the PD bureaucrats
who, by bloating their o¢ ces, push up the market wage, hurting entrepreneurial pro￿ts accordingly.
PD agents. In the lean equilibrium, all PD agents become entrepreneurs and receive a payo⁄ equal to
￿(￿) ¬ ￿. In the bloated equilibrium, a fraction  of them obtain a bureaucratic job, which yields
utility  ¬￿￿  ￿(￿)¬￿; the remainder fraction (1¬) receive a payo⁄ equal to ￿(￿￿)¬￿￿.
Therefore, all PD agents are better o⁄ in a lean equilibrium.
Notice that the only culprits of the PD agents￿lower welfare are, in the end, the PD bureaucrats.
In that regard, in situations with multiple equilibria as in Figure 2 (iii), if all PD agents could
simultaneously coordinate to stay away from the public sector, they would all agree to do that, as it
makes every one of them better o⁄. (In addition, if such an agreement is reached, no PD agent will
￿nd any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the agreement, since ￿(￿)  .)
Unskilled agents. In this case the welfare comparison is less straightforward than before. On the one
hand, the excessive labour demand that originates from the PD bureaucrats drives up the equilibrium
wage, which is bene￿cial to the those agents whose only choice is to supply their labour endowment.
On the other hand, like anybody else in the economy, they must pay higher taxes, which lowers their




, in our speci￿c setup,
the former e⁄ect always dominates the latter, hence: ￿￿2 ¬ ￿￿  ￿2 ¬ ￿. Therefore, whenever
multiple equilibria are feasible, the unskilled prefer the bloated public sector equilibrium to the lean
one, as the higher wage they receive in the former more than compensates the higher taxes they must
pay.
The fact that the unskilled receive higher wages when there are rent-seeking bureaucrats is actually
a general result that can be readily observed from Corollary 1. Their welfare comparison across the
di⁄erent cases described in Corollary 1 is, though, more complex than that between the two possible
equilibria within the multiple equilibria case discussed in the above paragraph. The reason being that
comparing di⁄erent cases involves comparing welfare in situations where the bureaucrats salary  also
di⁄ers, which in turn a⁄ects the total amount of taxes in the economy too. Nevertheless, the fact that
21larger  tend to give room to equilibria with rent-seeking bureaucrats and, consequently, higher wages
in the unskilled labour market means that the unskilled might in some cases be sympathetic to paying
higher salaries to the bureaucrats, even if that means paying higher taxes. This particular trade-o⁄
is what we proceed to study in the next section, where we endogenise  as the political outcome of
majority voting.
Remark 2 All our previous analysis has implicitly assumed that the government is always able
to collect enough taxes to ￿nance the entire public sector. Given that taxes are lump sum and the
unskilled workers are those whose earnings are the lowest, this will be the case so long as 2¬ ￿ 0
holds in equilibrium. Although we skipped this issue to ease our exposition, it is fair to say that the
parametric con￿guration of the model could be explicitly restricted such that this condition always
holds in the market general equilibria.
4 Political Economy General Equilibrium: endogenous B
In this section, we endogenise the salary of the bureaucrats within a framework where individuals vote
for  before all market interactions described up to now take place.21 From now onwards, we drop
Assumption 4, and let  take any non-negative value.
De￿nition 2 (Political Economy General Equilibrium) A political economy general equilibrium
(PEGE) is characterised by: i) a market wage, , ii) a bureaucrats salary, , and iii) an occupational
choice by each agent in the economy; such that:
1. The level of  is determined by universal majority voting before the agents make their occupa-
tional choices.
2. The economy is in a market general equilibrium according to De￿nition 1.
In order to make the above de￿nition instrumental to our analysis, we need to be a bit more precise
in terms of the voting process and how individuals make their voting choices. Regarding the former,
our majority voting works as follows: each agent in the economy votes for a particular  2 R+, and
the  that gathers the largest number of votes is o⁄ered to the bureaucrats. If the level of  that
receives the largest number of votes does not attract enough applicants to cover all the bureaucratic
21Obviously, this should not be taken literally. Rather, we could think of it as a shortcut for a more general democratic
process in which individuals vote for parties which are associated to di⁄erent policies in terms of the organisation of
the state (which includes, among other things, setting the remuneration of bureaucrats). Notice that alternative policy
variables that seem plausible to be altered and would also a⁄ect self-selection into bureaucracy are ￿ (cheating detection
probability) and ￿ (punishment severity).
22jobs, the su⁄rage is repeated until a  that is able to do so is o⁄ered (note that otherwise we would
be violating condition 3 in De￿nition 1). Voting is costless, both in terms of time and utility.
Concerning how agents choose which  to vote for: we follow Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), and
assume that individuals are conditionally sincere, in the sense that no agent prefers a decrease in the
expected vote for the  he has voted for. This implies that all individuals behave as if they were
pivotal, and thus vote for the  that maximises their expected payo⁄s.
Finally, individuals have rational expectations and, hence, they bear in mind that the level of
 will in￿ uence the market general equilibria that may possibly arise. In particular, when choosing
which  to vote for, individuals take into account the fact that di⁄erent levels of  will be linked
with: i) di⁄erent (possible) equilibrium wages, and ii) di⁄erent (possible) levels of taxation needed to
￿nance total public expenditure. Since the mass of unskilled agents  is larger than one, the unskilled
represent the median voter. As a result, in a PEGE, the salary of bureaucrats will be equal to the
level of  that maximises the expected utility of the unskilled.
As voting will be repeated until the o⁄ered  is able to attract at least a mass  of skilled agents
to the state bureaucracy; in a PEGE,  cannot be too low. More precisely, the lowest  that could
be o⁄ered is that one that would make PSM agents indi⁄erent between entrepreneurship and state
bureaucracy, at the wage that clears the unskilled labour market when only PSM agents apply for
bureaucratic jobs (that is, at ￿).















where b  stems from solving ￿(￿) =  ¬ (1 + ￿)
¬1 for , and b   (￿) for any ￿ 2 [1]
Proof. In Appendix.
From Corollary 1, we can observe that, given the set of parameters (￿￿;￿￿ and ), the
wages ￿ = (2 ¬ )(1 ¬ ) and ￿￿ = [(2 ¬ ) + 2(1 ¬ ￿)](1 ¬ ), which would prevail in the
di⁄erent equilibrium cases, are both independent of the speci￿c level of  (although the value of 




will lead, with probability one, to an equilibrium wage equal to ￿. As a result, since agents internalise





: intuitively, the same equilibrium wage, ￿, can be achieved at a "cheaper price"
by voting for  = b .
22More precisely, by varying , the only relevant change in the labour market equations (10) and (11) turns out to be
the threshold wage   at which labour demand becomes non-monotonic. (This can be visually observed from Figure 2,
where the only thing that di⁄ers in the three cases is )




, where (￿) was speci￿ed in (13), is a strictly dominated
strategy for the unskilled agents.









, individual taxes equal (￿ + )(1 + ), which are strictly increasing in . Hence,




is strictly dominated by  = b .
With a similar reasoning, we can also ￿nd an upper bound for the  that the unskilled would vote
for. Intuitively, no unskilled agent will ever vote for a   , since setting  =  turns out to be
the "cheapest" way to guarantee an equilibrium wage equal to ￿￿.
Lemma 3 Voting for a   , where  was speci￿ed in (12), is a strictly dominated strategy for the
unskilled agents.
Proof. Any  ￿ , leads to a unique market general equilibrium where the wage equals ￿￿. For
 ￿ , individual taxes equal [(2 ¬ ￿)￿￿ + ](1 + ), which are strictly increasing in . Hence,
for the unskilled, voting for any    is strictly dominated by  = .
The previous lemmas imply that we can restrict the set of  which the unskilled agents would
possibly vote for quite drastically: if the unskilled would like to induce a market general equilibrium
in which a wage equal to ￿ (￿￿) holds as a unique equilibrium, they will vote for b  (). Whether
the unskilled are better o⁄ by voting for b  or for  depends on how the trade o⁄ between ￿ higher
wages vs. higher taxes￿resolves. The following proposition states the conditions under which the
higher wages earned by the unskilled when  =  more than compensate the higher taxes they have
to pay in that case.
Proposition 2 Suppose 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) ¬ 1
1+￿  3 Then, there exist feasible parametric con￿gurations







￿ [1), for which, if the unskilled agents had to choose between
voting for b  or , they would vote for . In particular, the unskilled strictly prefer  to b  if and
only if the following condition holds:










To grasp some intuition for Proposition 2, note ￿rstly, that 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) ¬ 1
1+￿ =  ¬ b . In that
sense, 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) ¬ 1
1+￿  3 states that heterogeneity in preferences for state bureaucracy between
PD and PSM agents must not be too large. Otherwise, the lowest salary needed to induce PD agents
24to apply for bureaucratic jobs as a unique equilibrium, , would be too big relative to b  and, hence,
relatively too costly for taxpayers. Secondly, an increase in  (in ￿) raises (lowers) the value of the
LHS of (17), making it more (less) likely to hold. For the former, a higher  dilutes the cost of paying
higher bureaucratic salaries among a larger mass of taxpayers. For the latter, a larger ￿ means that
the fraction of PD bureaucrats in a bloated equilibrium will be lower, and so will be the ensuing
upwards push on wages, making it then less appealing for the unskilled vote for  instead of for b .23
Proposition 2 would complete our analysis if agents were constrained to vote for bureaucratic
salaries that lead to market general equilibria which are unique for a given  ￿that is, cases (i)
and (ii) in Corollary 1. However, we are not setting such a constraint anywhere in our model, and





. For these cases, we will focus on sunspots equilibria: we will look at situations
in which all the unskilled agents share the same expectation about the probability with which all
PD agents will coordinate on whether or not to apply to bureaucracy. We will, however, place some
restriction on these expectations. In particular, it seems reasonable to suppose that expectations
about the probability of coordination failures are "monotonic": the higher , the more likely it is that
PD agents will apply for bureaucratic jobs. More explicitly:
Assumption 6 Let  ￿ 0 and denote by () : R+ ! [01] the probability that the equilibrium
strategies of the PD agents are to apply for bureaucratic jobs. We assume: (i) 0() ￿ 0, (ii)
 () = 0 for all   (￿), and  () = 1 for all  ￿ .




, we can then write down the indirect payo⁄ function of the unskilled:
 [ ()] = f()[2 ¬  + 2(1 ¬ ￿)][1 +  ¬ 2(2 ¬ ￿)]
+(1 ¬ ())(2 ¬ )(1 +  ¬ 2)g










, they would obviously choose that one that
maximises (18), which we denote e  = argmax2[(￿)] : f [ ()]g. (We are implicitly assuming
that the there is one single value that maximises  [ ()]; this is just for simplicity and without any
loss of generality.)
Given the expectations summarised by the function () in Assumption 6, the choice by the
unskilled of which  to vote for reduces then to selecting one among the following three values: ,
b , or e . We assume that in cases where two of them (or all of them) yield identical expected utility,
the unskilled vote for the lower (lowest) value.
23The wage gap between the two types of equilibria is: 
￿￿ ¬ 
￿ = 2(1 ¬ ￿)(1 ¬ ), which falls with ￿:
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When  = , the political outcome leads to a bloated public sector equilibrium with probability
1. When  = e , the political outcome leads to a bloated public sector equilibrium with probability
( e ). When  = b , the political outcome leads to a lean public sector equilibrium with probability
1.
In summary, this section shows that equilibria featuring a bloated public sector may arise endoge-
nously from a rather standard median-voter approach. The reason is that the unskilled workers may
be willing to support rent-seeking bureaucrats, since the former indirectly bene￿t from the actions
perpetrated by the latter in the form of in￿ ated market wages. Oversized and ine¢ ciently run public
sectors have been commonplace in the past populist governments in Latin America. In that regard,
our model may then shed light on the underlying reasons that have made them so successful. These
governments had strongly relied on widespread support coming from the working class population as
a whole. Moreover, this was the case despite being generally perceived as running largely ine⁄ective
public sectors, as summarised by the following fragment taken from Geddes (1994):
Survey evidence [for Argentina and Brazil] indicates the existence of a widespread latent interest in admin-
istrative reform. Most people believed they would bene￿t from reforms that improved the quality of state
intervention in the economy and the quality of government services to the public. Nevertheless, during
democratic periods, when widespread political participation should have made it possible to make e⁄ective
demands for an end to corruption, governments in Latin American countries rarely passed reform laws.
Quite the contrary. The preferences that actually found expression in law strongly opposed administrative
reform. (p. 26.)
5 Empirical Analysis
So far we have presented a theoretical framework that allows us to jointly determine the size and
skill composition of the public sector, the scope for private sector development and the resulting
labour market outcomes, within a general equilibrium model that allows for endogenous bureaucratic
remuneration.
The model being a general equilibrium one, together with the fact that multiple equilibria are
feasible for some parametric con￿gurations, poses a signi￿cant challenge in terms of providing mean-
ingful evidence towards the presence of the mechanisms proposed in this paper. For this reason, we
26follow a reduced-form approach and confront separately a number of results derived from the model,
making use of a variety of data sources, ranging from cross-country to household data. Some of the
most evident predictions of the model, such as the correlation between overall size of public sector
employment and the level of development, could be argued to be driven by other mechanisms than that
proposed by our model (for example, if the public sector acts as an employer where private activity is
absent due to lack of entrepreneurial skills). However, in what follows we also make an e⁄ort to tackle
some other subtler questions involving the skill composition of the public sector, its quality and the
resulting e⁄ect on incomes at di⁄erent educational levels, which are much more speci￿c to our own
setup. In particular, we concentrate on the following three main implications of the model:
1. Quality and Composition of the Public Sector: the model predicts that when the public sector
becomes an attractive option for rent-seeking agents its composition would tilt towards a greater
share of unskilled workers. As a result, regions with better working public sectors should also
exhibit a larger fraction of skilled public employees.
2. Public Sector and Development: another important feature of the model is that, by expanding
the demand of unskilled workers (which, in turn, raises their wages), the public sector may end
up crowding out the private sector. It follows that:
(a) Areas that have a larger public sector employment tend to be poorer.
(b) Private sector is sti￿ ed in areas with large and relatively unskilled public employment.
3. Skill Premium: from the previous result, areas with an oversized and unskilled public sector
would pay relatively higher wages to blue collar workers. In that case, it follows that the skill
premium should be lower than if the public sector was not bloated.
Prediction 1 is tested by exploiting cross country variation using internationally comparable mea-
sures of public sector performance and skills composition in the public sector. We provide evidence for
Prediction 2a by looking at four countries with di⁄erent levels of development that show signi￿cant
heterogeneity in regional development, namely Brazil, Italy, Spain and the United States. A similar
exercise is done using regional variation from Argentina￿ s provinces where we test the relationship
between level or composition of public sector employment and private sector activity, as described in
Prediction 2b. To deal with Prediction 3, we also use the data on Argentinian provinces, and we ￿rst
characterise the apparent equilibrium in di⁄erent capital cities. Based on this characterisation, and
using data on incomes from a household survey representative at the city level, we next test whether
the skill premium is indeed larger in cities that show features associated with a lean public sector
equilibrium, as described by the model.
275.1 Quality and composition of the public sector across countries
One of the main predictions of our model concerns how the composition and the performance of the
public sector vary depending on which type of equilibrium the economy is in. More precisely, the
model predicts that if we take two economies with the same level of development, availability of skills
and "natural" size of the public sector (i.e. the level of  in the model), the country with a public
sector that is relatively more attractive to rent-seeking agents should exhibit a public administration
that performs worse, and which grows by hiring a greater proportion of unskilled workers. To assess
this, we run a regression linking a measure of public sector performance to its proportion of unskilled
workers, using a 5-year average cross-section of countries, for the period 2002-2006, and sequentially
adding controls that account for the level of income, the overall size of the public sector and the stock
of skills in the economy. Additionally, to control for regional characteristics, we include a set of dummy
variables by continent for developing regions and a category for industrialised countries.
As a measure of public sector performance, we use Transparency International￿ s Corruption Percep-
tion Index (CPI) and World Bank￿ s Control of Corruption, Government E⁄ectiveness and Regulatory
Quality indices, whose value increase the better the perception of government performance. The
measure of GDP per capita is obtained from World Bank Development Indicators. We use labour
statistics collected by the International Labor Organisation (ILO). The proportion of unskilled labour
in the public sector is de￿ned according to ISCO-88 classi￿cation and includes clerks, service workers,
machine operators, etc. (codes 4 to 9). Skilled correspond to codes 1 to 3 and includes managers,
professionals and technicians. Public sector comprises public administration and defence.
Table 1 shows the results. In column (1) we present the unconditional correlation between the
CPI and the proportion of unskilled workers in the public sector. The correlation is negative and
signi￿cant, suggesting that countries where the public sector is perceived as performing worse have
also a more unskilled public sector, on average. Some of this variation could result from common
characteristics within continents that would explain the quality or composition of the public sector.
For example, if governments in Latin America are systematically perceived as more corrupt on average
than those in Asia, or if Eastern European countries have systematically bigger public sectors than
other regions. To address this, in the following column we include regional dummies that control for
average regional di⁄erences. That means that we exploit within regional variation, i.e. we compare
countries in the same region. The negative correlation between CPI and the share of unskilled in the
public sector still holds.
In the following three columns we include progressively the above-mentioned country controls that
might be suspected to be driving (or, at least, a⁄ecting) our results. We start, in column (3), by
controlling for the overall size of the public sector (which is related to our parameter  in the model)
28and regional ￿xed e⁄ects. For example, it may be that the previous correlation is driven by the fact
that some countries prefer larger public sectors and that the perception of performance and the share
of unskilled is simply re￿ ecting an issue of scale: beyond a certain point, large governments might only
be able to further increase their services provision by hiring unskilled workers and, simultaneously, be
more subject to managerial di¢ culties that reduce the performance score. Column (3) shows that the
coe¢ cient on size of the public sector is positive and signi￿cant, i.e. that the public sector grows by
hiring proportionally more unskilled workers. However, the correlation of interest remains signi￿cant
and negative, suggesting that even when maintaining ￿xed the overall size of the public sector, its
performance and proportion of unskilled remain negatively correlated, as predicted by the model.
In column (4) we also control for the proportion of skilled workers in the economy. The concern here
would be that the availability of skills in the economy is what drives both public sector performance
and the proportion of unskilled in the public sector. Unsurprisingly, the negative sign on the measure
of skills suggests that the public sector tends to be more skilled when a larger stock of skills is
available. However, it does not account fully for the negative correlation between performance and
skill composition of the public sector. Similarly, this holds too when controlling for a country￿ s GDP
per capita, in column (5). Finally, in columns (6) to (8) we use di⁄erent measures of government
performance (from the World Bank). Our results still hold when using these alternative measures of
government performance.
To summarise, an important feature of our model is that bloated public sectors are not strictly
de￿ned by the size of the public sector in itself (that is, by the value of ), but actually by how
it grows. In particular, the model predicts that ill-performing public sectors end up bloated with
unskilled workers, displaying thus a di⁄erent composition in terms of skills compared to that of well-
run public sectors. In line with the model, this section has shown that government performance is
negatively correlated with the average skills in the public sector, even when controlling for country
characteristics and regional dummies that could have been driving this correlation.
5.2 Public sector employment and development: regional analysis
Predictions 2a and 2b suggest a negative link between the share of public employment (and its com-
position) and measures of economic development, such as income per head or indicators of private
sector activity.
Unlike in the previous subsection, tracing this correlation using cross-country data does not seem
a very promising approach, as the overall size of the public sector is itself a variable that di⁄ers
substantially across countries.24 In terms of our model, this is captured by the , which may be
24For example, the public sector in the US clearly carries out a smaller set of activities than that of Sweden. It is
natural to expect then the public employment share in Sweden to be larger than that in US. Yet, this comparison reveals
29thought of as a country-speci￿c parameter. A more promising approach appears to be then to look
at regional variation within countries, under the presumption the role of the public sector tends to
be much more homogeneous within countries than it is across countries. In that regard, since we are
exploiting variation across regions, an important point is that we need to ￿nd countries that display
substantial regional inequality (both in terms of income per head and level of industrialisation) and
that are characterised by relatively decentralised political administration. Inequality is somewhat
important because the model predicts di⁄erent levels of development to be associated with di⁄erent
levels of public sector employment.
We choose three developed economies, Italy, Spain and US, which exhibit, in that order, the largest
degree of regional inequality (measured by the Gini coe¢ cient across regions) among the 11 industri-
alised economies for which Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show regional income data. Additionally,
we use data on Brazil and Argentina, two federal developing countries with substantial regional dis-
parities. In particular, we use the three developed countries and Brazil to illustrate Prediction 2a
by running a simple linear regression of the share of the public employment on income per capita.
We also include three countries where we would not expect the correlation proposed in this paper
to hold, because of signi￿cantly smaller regional inequality, namely Sweden, Canada and Denmark.
Subsequently, we make use of a more complete and detailed dataset for Argentina to investigate Pre-
diction 2b, and to control for additional regional characteristics which according to the model could
also in￿ uence the correlation between economic development and public employment.
Table 2 shows results for the ￿rst four relatively unequal countries in columns (1) to (4)25. Across
the board we ￿nd that public sector is substantially larger in poorer regions, as predicted by the
model. The link seems to be strongest in Italy and weakest in the United States, a result somehow
unsurprising, given the relative size and tasks allocated to the public sector in each of the countries.
However, the same cannot be said about Sweden, Canada or Denmark, as shown in the next three
columns. For all three countries coe¢ cients are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. For Sweden
the coe¢ cient is negative, but much smaller than for the countries in the ￿rst four columns and for
Denmark the coe¢ cient has even a positive sign. The negative sign for Canada is explained by an
outlier: as soon as we exclude the natural resource rich Alberta from Canada the coe¢ cient for the
remaining regions (including Ontario) becomes positive, but still remains not signi￿cant. As expected,
we do not ￿nd evidence of di⁄erence in the level of public sector employment across regions in countries
with lower inter-regional inequality.
nothing about the possibility that public employment is used in order to create and extract rents, which is the crucial
argument in our paper.
25In the regressions, we exclude the region where the national capital city is located, whenever its population is a
signi￿cant majority of that of the region. This applies to all cases but Ontario, in Canada.
30We next use data on Argentine provinces for four years, to test Prediction 2b. We use two
di⁄erent measures of private sector development: the log of product per capita and the log of foreign
direct investment per capita (FDI). We have collected data on public sector employment and its skill
composition. Province controls include government expenditure, secondary school enrolment, roads
and population. Table 3 presents the results.
Columns (1) to (5) look at the correlation between public sector employment and indicators of
development or private sector activity, namely provincial product per capita and FDI, respectively. In
column (1) we ￿nd that provinces with larger public sector employment tend to be poorer, even though
the correlation is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0. This could be explained by the presence of other
mechanisms at play, that have di⁄erent direction to the one we propose in our model and that average
out the e⁄ects sought in the regression. For example, provinces with more natural resources tend to
be richer and have bigger governments, as it happens in some southern provinces26. To control for
this, we include the log of government expenditure per capita in column (2) and we ￿nd, as expected,
that government expenditure per capita increases with income per capita. More importantly, the
coe¢ cient of public sector employment is still negative, becomes signi￿cant and greater in absolute
magnitude. This result is in line with the model: if we compare two provinces with the same level of
government expenditure, the province where the public sector employs relatively more workers tends
to be poorer, since it is using more of their workers to create and extract rents.
Remember that an important feature of our model is the fact that public sector employment crowds
out the private sector via the wage-e⁄ect. As an alternative measure of private sector development
(and, possibly, more indicative of it), in column (4) we use a measure of FDI in the province and ￿nd
the same negative correlation with the share of public employment.
In columns (3) and (5) we control for variables that might capture other features of the model. For
example, population (that accounts for labour supply), secondary enrolment (controls for the stock of
skills in the province) and roads (as a proxy for capital/productivity at the province level, measured
by  in the model). In both cases, we ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant correlation between the measure
of economic activity and public sector employment.
Finally, in the next ￿ve columns, we replicate the same regressions, this time using the ratio of
skilled to unskilled in the public sector. The bloating of the public sector that is associated with
less private activity in the model would imply a positive coe¢ cient of the skills composition on the
measures of economic activity at the province level. The results show the same pattern as in the
regressions using public sector employment and suggest that private activity and output are greater
in provinces where the public sector looks lean and skilled. Or, in other words, if we compare two
provinces with a similar level of government expenditure, population, skills and productivity, the
26For example, oil and natural gas rich Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz.
31province with a public sector that is relatively more skilled tends to display higher income per head
and more private economic activity.
5.3 Public employment and skill premium in Argentinean urban households
To test Prediction 3 in the model, we proceed in two steps. We ￿rst characterise di⁄erent labour
markets according to the predictions of the model, aiming to identify situations that resemble those
featured in a lean public sector or in a bloated public sector equilibrium. Then, we compare the skill
premium across the di⁄erent types of labour market outcomes. To do this, we use a representative
household level dataset from urban areas in capital cities of provinces in Argentina for the year 1998.
We only use information on regional capital cities, where the executive, legislative and judiciary
branches of the province governments are located.
In the model, a lean equilibrium is associated with a low share of public employment. Additionally,
in such equilibrium, the public sector tends to be relatively more skilled, i.e. it displays a high ratio
of skilled to unskilled employees.
To characterise di⁄erent provinces￿labour markets, we ￿rst need to identify a labour market that
seems to satisfy the key features of a lean equilibrium. This sets a benchmark for what would be
"reasonable" public sector employment in the Argentine context. A good starting point seems to be
the city of C￿rdoba, the second largest city after Buenos Aires and the capital city of the province of
C￿rdoba. As shown in Table 4, among head of households that are employed, around 6.8% work in
C￿rdoba￿ s public sector. When broken down by skills, only 5.5% of heads of households with complete
secondary school and 9.9% with further education are employed by the public sector in C￿rdoba. The
average ratios for all other capital cities are 17.6%, 16.4% and 22%, respectively. The di⁄erences
are statistically signi￿cant at 1% level. When looking at the average skills by sector, in Table 5, the
public sector in C￿rdoba employs more than 42% of skilled workers. This contrasts sharply with the
other capital cities￿average of 27% skilled workers. The di⁄erence is signi￿cant even when taking
away the di⁄erence between C￿rdoba￿ s private sector and the rest of capital cities￿ , in a di⁄erence
in di⁄erences analysis that takes away province characteristics that a⁄ect private and public sector
employment equally within a city, such as the pool of skilled workers available, and characteristics
that a⁄ect di⁄erences in sectorial employment across all cities.
We set C￿rdoba as a benchmark and characterize the remaining capital cities using household level




￿ + ￿X + 
where  is a dummy equal to 1 if the head of household  in capital city  works in the public
sector.  are a set of city dummies and their coe¢ cients inform us about the probability that an
32individual living in that city works in the public sector, once we have controlled for economic and
demographic characteristics X. These include age, age squared, educational attainment, number
of income earners in the household, gender and dwelling characteristics. Since we set C￿rdoba as a
benchmark, i.e. it is the omitted dummy in the regression, the estimates of ￿ will give the di⁄erence of
a given city relative to C￿rdoba, in percentage points. All regressions use weights and cluster standard
errors at the city level.
Table 6 summarises our results27. Only 4 other cities lie within 5 percentage points of C￿rdoba, in
terms of public sector employment. These are San Luis, TucumÆn, Salta and Mendoza. An individual
in the other 16 cities in the survey is at least 7.5 percentage points more likely to work in the public
sector than a resident of Cordoba is. That would imply that more than 15% of the head of households
work for the government. In some cases, such as Rio Gallegos and Formosa, the di⁄erence with
C￿rdoba is larger than 20 percentage points, implying that at least 1 in 5 heads of household work in
the public sector. When divided by skills, the regressions show that cities where public employment is
very high, the probability of working in the public sector is equally high for both skilled and unskilled.
Similarly, cities with low public employment, show it for both levels of skills. Among the cities ranked
in the middle, some of them show a high probability among skilled workers while not so high among
unskilled, a symptom of a lean public sector equilibrium, even though the level of public employment
remains high.
Finally, we also look at the composition of skills in the public sector, as the last feature to charac-
terise the type of equilibrium across cities. The probability of being skilled in C￿rdoba among public
sector workers di⁄ers little from low or medium public sector cities28. However, the high public em-
ployment cities show a substantially lower ratio of skilled to unskilled than C￿rdoba, most notably
Santa Rosa (-14 percentage points lower ratio of skilled than C￿rdoba), La Rioja (-15 pp), Formosa
(-17 pp), NeuquØn (-24 pp), R￿o Gallegos (-31 pp) and Tierra del Fuego (-35 pp).
All these results combined together lead us to identify a group that seems to feature characteristics
of a lean equilibrium (C￿rdoba, Mendoza, Salta, TucumÆn and San Luis) and a group that seems to
be in a bloated equilibrium (R￿o Gallegos, Formosa, Tierra del Fuego, Santa Rosa, La Rioja and
NeuquØn)29.
Now, as a second step, we study income patterns across sectors and skills. In the model, the public
and private sector compete for blue collar workers. In a bloated public sector equilibrium, the wage
of the unskilled would be larger than it would be in an equilibrium without rent-seeking bureaucrats.
27Full results are available from the authors upon request.
28In one case, Santiago del Estero, the ratio of skill is 10 percentage points lower than in C￿rdoba. For all other low
and medium public employment cities, the di⁄erence with C￿rdoba goes from -7 percentage points to +3.
29Cities not included in either of these two groups are: Catamarca, Corrientes, La Plata, ParanÆ, Posadas, Resistencia,
San Juan, San Salvador de Jujuy, Santa FØ and Santiago del Estero.
33To test this, we run the following regression of the log income of the head of household working in
industry  in city  on  (a dummy equal to 1 if the individual has at least started some tertiary
studies) and its interaction with two dummies ( and ), grouping cities in the lean
or the bloated equilibrium, respectively. The omitted category includes all the cities for which the
preliminary analysis did not provide any clear indication of the type of equilibrium where the city
was. We include city and industry ￿xed e⁄ects, to control for characteristics that might set average
incomes at di⁄erent levels (e.g. productivity, amenities, etc.).
 = ￿ + ￿ + ￿X + ￿ +
￿ ￿  + ￿ ￿  + 
The coe¢ cients of interest are the ￿￿ s. ￿ provides information on the average income gap for
people with at least some tertiary education in the unclassi￿ed cities with respect to people that have
at most completed secondary school. ￿ and ￿ scale that gap up or down for people in cities classi￿ed
as lean and bloated equilibrium, respectively.
Similarly, to test the general equilibrium implication that the income gap across skills is smaller
in cities with larger public sectors, we also run a regression where we interact the education dummy
with the proportion of heads of household that are employed by the public sector at the city level. We
run two speci￿cations, one using the fraction of public employment and the other one using only the
proportion of unskilled head of household working in the public sector.
Column (1) in Table 7 uses information on all sectors and shows a positive baseline gap between
our de￿nition of skilled and unskilled, controlling for other characteristics such as age and age squared,
time in employment, gender and place of birth. The coe¢ cient for the interaction with cities in the
bloated equilibrium is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, meaning that the average income gap across
skills is similar to the one in the middle group of cities. However, the income gap in cities classi￿ed
as being in a lean equilibrium is signi￿cantly greater, which is consistent with the predictions of our
model, whereas the enlargement of the public sector is associated with a relative compression of the
skill premium. Since the model predicts this result to show in the private sector, we run the regression
for all workers, excluding those in Public Administration and Defence. Column (2) shows similar
results to those obtained in column (1): for the private sector, the skill income gap is greater in labour
markets that show the characteristics that the model associates with a lean public sector equilibrium.
We next try using a continuous measure of public employment at the city level. Admittedly, this
variable captures a feature that does not necessarily predict the type of equilibrium. However, if we
assume that the number of skilled positions is similar across provinces, it could well proxy for the
degree of bloating of the public sector. In column (3) we interact household head￿ s education with
the measure of public employment in the city and we ￿nd that the skill premium decreases with the
34size of public employment in the city. Column (4) shows that this phenomenon is also present for the
private sector.
Lastly, a variable that might capture better the degree public sector oversize, as presented in this
paper, is the proportion of unskilled workers in the public sector. In that regard, Columns (5) and
(6) show, again, that the skill premium is compressed in labour markets where unskilled workers are
more likely to work in the public sector30.
In brief, this section has shown that the premium skilled workers get paid over the unskilled is
squeezed in cities where the public sector hires extensively, especially among the unskilled labour force.
Most notably, and consistent with the idea of a unique labour market for blue collar workers, this result
is observed for the private sector. Together with evidence in the previous section, we interpret this
as evidence of the existence of a labour market mechanism across Argentine provinces through which
public sector employment practices a⁄ect private sector development.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a model in which the quality of the state bureaucracy crucially a⁄ects the level of
aggregate output and private entrepreneurship. The key mechanism at work rests on the idea that
rent-seeking behaviours lead to an over-sized public sector, bloated with unskilled workers. The model
shows that when the public sector expands its demand of unskilled workers in order to create and
extract rents, not only it wastes scarce budgetary resources, but it also sti￿ es entrepreneurial incentives.
In particular, an over-sized public sector pushes up the wage of unskilled workers above the level that
would prevail under an e¢ ciently-run public sector, which squeezes entrepreneurial pro￿ts and deters
potential entrepreneurs from allocating their skills in the private sector. In that regard, even if the
delivery of public services does not su⁄er in quantity or quality, excessive employment in the public
sector can prevent the development of economic activity.
Our model also shows that an ine¢ cient public sector may arise endogenously from a standard
political process, because the unskilled workers may indirectly bene￿t from bureaucratic rent seeking
in the form of higher wages. In that regard, our model may shed light on one of the underlying reasons
that have made several populist governments so successful in the past, despite being widely perceived
as running ine¢ ciently large and ine⁄ective public sectors (see Geddes, 1994).
The speci￿c type of equilibrium economies ￿nd themselves in depends to a large extent on the
parametric con￿guration of the model. Since many of these parameters somehow re￿ ect institutional
30Results found in this section are not sensitive to constraining the de￿nition of public sector to Public Administration
and Defence. We obtain qualitatively similar e⁄ects when using a broader de￿nition of public sector that includes other
industries such as health and education.
35features, an alternative way to read this result is that economies can aspire at reaching higher levels
of public sector e¢ ciency and private sector development if they manage to implement changes that
would avert the public sector drawing an excessive amount of human resources.
One important lesson is that the economy has got a lot to gain from improving the sorting mech-
anisms into di⁄erent occupations, in particular when it relates to state bureaucracy. Contrary to
a standard view in the public debate, improving sorting may sometimes require paying public bu-
reaucrats less (and not more), so as to resort to the sense of mission of certain agents while keeping
self-interested agents away31. An important caveat, not addressed in this paper, is that of public
sector capabilities: such a policy would only work if the payment gap is not too low to put o⁄ moti-
vated people with a minimum level of ability needed to provide public services of a certain standard.
Similarly, this might not be possible if the electorate vote for a policy of high wages in the public
sector.
Another set of policy implications could be related to the organisation of the public sector. For
example, by imposing employment standards in the public sector or improving their control and
enforcement (in the model, represented by the probability of being caught and its penalty). Alter-
natively, many times countries have a bloated set of institutions, where competences and functions
overlap. Addressing this, the number of bureaucratic posts available ( in our model), might reduce
the scope for rent-seeking behaviour to substantially a⁄ect the labour market equilibrium. In any
case, by promoting policies attracting the right type and quantity of people or reducing the scope for
opportunistic behaviour, the economy can avoid falling into a rent-seeking trap.
Appendix
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5 hold, and  (￿)    , implying that there exist
two equilibria in the economy: one in which the wage equals ￿ (the lean equilibrium), and one in
which it equals ￿￿ (the bloated equilibrium). Let  denote the amount of (lump-sum) taxes that each







Proof. Individual taxes must equal the summation of the wages of all the public workers and salaries
of all bureaucrats, divided by the total mass of individuals in the economy. Hence, by using (6) and
31An example of this controversy is the debate about MPs pay in British Parliament after the expenses scandal [see
The Economist (2009)]. Some argue that MPs should be paid more to avoid rent-seeking behaviour. Our paper suggests
that this would hinge on the type of people attracted to such positions after a wage hike.






[(2 ¬ ￿)￿￿ + ]
1 + 
 (21)
As a result, plugging the RHS of (20) and (21) into (19), and recalling that ￿ = (2 ¬ )(1 ¬ )




(2 ¬ )(1 +  ¬ 2)








[2 ¬  + 2(1 ¬ ￿)][1 +  ¬ 2(2 ¬ ￿)]





From (22) and (23), it then follows that ￿￿2 ¬ ￿￿  ￿2 ¬ ￿ if and only if:
[2 ¬  + 2(1 ¬ ￿)][1 +  ¬ 2(2 ¬ ￿)]  (2 ¬ )(1 +  ¬ 2).
After some algebra, this inequality leads to 2  1+2(2 ¬ ￿) which turns out to be always satis￿ed
for any combination of: (￿) 2 (12) ￿ [1) and  satisfying Assumption 5.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let￿ s ￿rst start by proving that b   (￿).
Lemma. 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) ¬ 1
1+￿ ￿  ) (￿)  b 
Proof. From (13) and (16), we can write:














where ￿(￿;) ￿ 122 ¬ 162￿+4￿22 ¬ 4(1¬ ￿) Since (1 + ￿￿)2¬ (1 + ￿)
¬1 ￿ , it su¢ ces to
prove that ￿(￿;) + 4(1 ¬ )
2  0. Next, by noting that for ￿  0, if then su¢ ces to prove
that it holds for  = 2, that is:
122 ¬ 162￿ + 4￿22 ¬ 8(1 ¬ ￿) + 4(1 ¬ )
2  0 (24)
Finally, noting that, for any ￿ 2 [1], the LHS of (24) is strictly increasing in ￿, it then su¢ ces to
prove that it holds for ￿ = ; that is: 122 ¬ 163 + 44 ¬ 8(1 ¬ ) + 4(1 ¬ )
2  0, which simpli￿es
to (1 ¬ )4  0, completing the proof. k
It then follows that if b  ￿   (￿), there exists a unique political economy general equilibrium,
and in that equilibrium only PSM agents apply for the bureaucratic jobs and the equilibrium wage
equals ￿. Furthermore, since b  solves ￿(￿) = ¬(1 + ￿)
¬1 for , then for any   b , PSM agents
strictly prefer entrepreneurship to state bureaucracy, implying it does not exist a political economy
general equilibrium in which   b . ￿
37Proof of Proposition 2. Let  () denote the utility received by the unskilled agents in a political
economy general equilibrium where the bureaucrats salary equals . Then, since b  () leads to a
unique equilibrium wage ￿ (￿￿), using (22) and (23), we may write:
 ( b ) =
(2 ¬ )(1 +  ¬ 2)






[2 ¬  + 2(1 ¬ ￿)][1 +  ¬ 2(2 ¬ ￿)]





From those two expressions, it follows that:
 ()   ( b ) ,
[2 ¬ 2(2 ¬ ￿) ¬ 1](1 ¬ ￿)
(1 ¬ )
   ¬ b  (25)
Then, using (12) and (16), we can see that  ¬ b  = 1
2 (1 + ￿￿) ¬ 1
1+￿, from which (17) obtains.





where  ￿ 1 ¬
q
1
2. Notice, ￿rst, that ￿(￿) is strictly increasing in , hence in a global maximum
 ! 2. Second, notice that ￿(2￿;) = [4 ¬ 2(2 ¬ ￿) ¬ 1](1 ¬ ￿)(1 ¬ ), which is strictly de-
creasing in ￿ 2 [1), hence in a global maximum it must be that ￿ = . Finally, observing that




, it follows that ￿(￿;) reaches a
global maximum when  ! 2, ￿ =  and  ! 0, in which case ￿(￿;) ! 3. ￿
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44Proportion of workers in Public Sector
Total Unskilled Skilled
6.8% 5.5% 9.9% Córdoba
(0.011) (0.011) (0.023)
17.6% 16.4% 22.1% Rest of
capital cities (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
- 10.9% - 10.9% - 12.2% Difference
(0.016)*** (0.019)*** (0.033)***
Table 4: Public employment, by skills in Cordoba and other capital cities.
Proportion of skilled workers by sector
Total Private Public
28.8% 27.8% 42.1% Córdoba
(0.019) (0.019) (0.081)
21.7% 20.5% 27.2% Rest of
capital cities (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
7.1% 7.3% 14.9% Difference
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.073)***
Table 5: Skilled workers by sector, in Cordoba and other capital cities
Public Sector Employment in
Argentine Provinces Capital Cities
Percentage points above Córdoba
Total Unskilled Skilled
Bloated Equilibrium
Río Gallegos 24.8 23.4 26.8
Formosa 20.5 19.3 24.3
Tierra del Fuego 16.4 14.1 21.6
Santa Rosa 16 13.8 20.7
La Rioja 15.4 13.4 21.7
Neuquén 14.1 15 9.5
Lean Equilibrium
Córdoba n/a n/a n/a
San Luis 4.6 3.8 5.5
S. M. de Tucumán 3.8 3.4 3.3
Salta 2.6 1.2 6.7
Mendoza 0.0 - 0.1 0.6
Table 6: Labour markets characterization in Argentinian provinces￿capital cities.
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5
0
2
1
0
3
1
1
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
4
5
0
.
4
5
0
.
4
5
0
.
4
5
0
.
4
5
0
.
4
5
R
o
b
u
s
t
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
t
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
;
 
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
;
 
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
;
 
*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
,
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
c
i
t
y
-
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
“
T
e
r
t
i
a
r
y
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
”
 
i
s
 
a
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
h
e
a
d
 
o
f
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
h
a
s
 
s
o
m
e
 
t
e
r
t
i
a
r
y
 
o
r
 
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
“
L
e
a
n
E
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
G
r
o
u
p
”
 
i
s
 
a
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
c
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
C
ó
r
d
o
b
a
,
 
S
a
n
 
L
u
i
s
,
 
S
.
 
M
.
 
d
e
 
T
u
c
u
m
á
n
,
 
S
a
l
t
a
 
a
n
d
 
M
e
n
d
o
z
a
.
 
T
h
e
 
“
B
l
o
a
t
e
d
E
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
G
r
o
u
p
”
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
R
í
o
 
G
a
l
l
e
g
o
s
,
 
F
o
r
m
o
s
a
,
 
T
i
e
r
r
a
 
d
e
l
 
F
u
e
g
o
,
 
S
a
n
t
a
 
R
o
s
a
,
 
L
a
 
R
i
o
j
a
 
a
n
d
 
N
e
u
q
u
é
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
o
m
i
t
t
e
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
a
l
l
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
c
i
t
i
e
s
.
 
 
“
(
U
n
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
)
 
C
i
t
y
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
”
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
c
i
t
y
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
o
f
(
u
n
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
)
h
e
a
d
s
 
o
f
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
 
t
h
a
t
w
o
r
k
 
i
n
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
f
e
n
c
e
.
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
 
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
,
 
g
e
n
d
e
r
,
 
t
i
m
e
 
i
n
 
j
o
b
,
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
o
f
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
,
 
d
w
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
p
l
a
c
e
 
o
f
 
b
i
r
t
h
.
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
e
 
c
i
t
y
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
9
8
.
T
a
b
l
e
7
:
S
k
i
l
l
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
b
y
t
y
p
e
o
f
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
i
n
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
i
a
n
p
r
o
v
i
n
c
e
s
￿
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
c
i
t
i
e
s
.
46